Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

State of Utah v. Richard Menke : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Spikes; J. Anderson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Mark R. Moffat; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Menke, No. 880475 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1285

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

&rtiiwi

JtAH
C FU
>0
®
A10
DOCKET NO-

THE COi
OORT OF APPEALS OP THE I SHI

OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
v.
Ca
Pr

RICHARD MENKE,
Defendant

lip

""88047 5-CA
No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELL

Appeal from a judgment

and convl(tt||ll|Vi pursuant to a

conditional plea for Retail Theft, a clasb A. misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-602(1) pLliirrae Third Circuit Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Grant, Judge,
presiding.

MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Salt lake Legal Defender Assoc.
| South, #300
424 East
Salt Lakep ! Ity, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
JOHN SPIKES
J. ANDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State Street #3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: 468-3422

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
v.
Case No. 880475-CA
Priority No. 2

RICHARD MENKE,
Defendant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a judgment

and conviction pursuant to a

conditional plea for Retail Theft, a class A. misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-602(1) in the Third Circuit Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Grant, Judge,
presiding.

MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Salt lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
JOHN SPIKES
J. ANDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 South State Street #3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: 468-3422

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

,

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

,

TEXT OF THE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . ,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

,

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

,

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR. MENKE AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MR. MENKE'S
POSSESSIONS VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

CONCLUSION

A.

WHEN OFFICERS DALLING AND GILLES
STOPPED MR. MENKE, A SEIZURE
OCCURRED

B.

THE OFFICERS DETENTION OF MR. MENKE
WAS NOT BASED ON A REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT A CRIME
HAD BEEN OR WAS ABOUT TO HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED

C.

OFFICERS DALLING AND GILLES LACKED
PROBABLE CAUSE TO JUSTIFY THE
SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF MR. MENKE'S
POSSESSIONS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)

19

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)

17

People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Ca 1987)

12

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)

10

State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984)

9

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)

6,7

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1988)

11

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)

16

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

16

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 594 (1980)

7

United States v. Merritt, 732 P.2d 616 223 (5th Cir. 1984)

7

United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986)

16

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

10,11,14,15

Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)

16

People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 487 P.2d 449 (Ca. 1970)

13

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 118 (Utah 1985)

11

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

6,7,17
18

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1988), whereby a defendant in a circuit court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment

and conviction for any crime.

In this case, the

Honorable Paul G. Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake
Department in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered
final judgment

and conviction against Richard Menke for Retail

Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Menke's Motion

to Suppress evidence illegally seized from his person?

(a) Did the trial court err in its determination
that the officers had sufficient reasonable
suspicion to stop Mr. Menke?

(b) Did the trial court err in the determination
that the officers had sufficient probable
cause to seize and search property in
Mr. Menke's possession.

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their personsf houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Utah code Ann. §76-6-602(1)(193) as amended) provides in
pertinent part:
A person commits the offense of retail theft
when he knowingly: (1) takes possession of,
conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be
carried away or transferred, any merchandise
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a
retail mercantile establishment with no
intention of returning such merchandise or with
the intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possession , use or benefit of
such merchandise without paying the retail value
of such merchandise.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-606 (1953 as amended) provides as
follows:
A violation of this chapter shall be punished in accordance
with section 76-6-412(1)
Utah Code Ann §76-6-412(1)(c) (1953 as amended) provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable as follows:
(c) As a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen was more than $100 but does not exceed $250.
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Utah Code Ann §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides as
follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his action.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
V.

RICHARD MENKE,

:
:

Case No. 880475-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment

and conviction for

Retail Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-602(1) (1953 as amended).
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence taken
from him at the time of his arrest based on a violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (T.3, 106). The
trial court denied the motion.

On October 31, 1988, appellant

entered a conditional plea of guilty, specifically preserving his
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress
(See Addendum "A").

On October 31, 1988, the Honorable Paul G.

Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, sentenced Mr. Menke to serve nine
(9) months in the Salt Lake County Jail and to pay a fine of
$2,000.00.

Execution of the sentence was stayed pending Menke's

appeal of the trial court's ruling on the Motion to Suppress.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On August 26, 1988, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Salt Lake
City Police officers Robert Gilles and Ray Dalling were on patrol in
downtowm Salt Lake City. (T.6, 7, 8). Officers Gilles and Dalling
were not, at that time, working in their capacities as Salt Lake
City Police officers but rather were acting as "control officers"
for Job Corps, a federal government agency. (T.6, 36).

The officers were traveling eastbound on 100 South between
West Temple and Main Streets when Officer Gilles noticed defendant
removing "property " from underneath his shirt (t.7).
placed the "property" in an Albertsons

grocery bag.

^Menke then
Menke was at

this point 50 - 70 feet away from the officers on the South side of
the street (t.37)

Officer Gilles then commented "Ray, look at that

guy, he's got some stolen property hefs taking from underneath his
shirt" (T.8)

The officers then mad a U-turn to "check and see what

was going on" (T.8, 29). As of this point in time there had been no
reports of crime or theft in the area and no reports that a razor
had been stolen from Weinstock's (T.15, 37).

^Testimony at the hearing was unclear as to what Menke
removed and from where he removed it. Officer Gilles testified that
Menke removed a grey box from under his shirt (T. 16). Detective
Dalling stated he saw Menke "remove something from under his shirt"
(T. 29). Menke testified that he removed a McDonalds sack from
under a jacket positioned on his shoulder and placed it in an
Albertsons grocery sack.

- 2 -

Gilles instantaneously made certain assumptions regarding
what he had seen and concluded that Menke was in possession of
stolen property (T. 8, 18). Gilles parked his vehicle against the
curb.

Officer Dalling exited the vehicle, produced a "flat badge",

identified himself as an officer and stopped Menke. (T. 38).
Officer Dalling requested that Menke produce identification.

Menke

produced a wallet with an identification card (T. 8). Both officers
immediately began to question Menke about the contents of the sack
(T.8, 15, 30, 39). As stated by Officer Gilles "The thrust of our
questioning was that our suspicions were such that we were trying to
determine whether the defendant had a lawful right to be in
possession of the property that he had" (T.16).

Menke appeared

nervous and did not respond to the officers inquiries (T. 9, 38, 39).
Shortly after Menke was stopped, officers Gilles and
Dalling directed Menke to set on a nearby bench where the
questioning continued.
(T.20).

2

Menke was not told that he was free to go

The Albertsons bag and its contents were on the bench at

Menke's side (T.19).

^Testimony at the hearing was uncontroverted as to how
Menke came to be positioned on the bench. Officer Gilles testified
that the three "moved" from the planter to the bench (T. 15).
Officer Dalling's testimony was vague as to whether or not Menke was
directed to sit on the bench(T. 38). Menke testified that the
officers grasped his elbow and directed him to the bench (T. 68).
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Menke's hand was on the bag (T. 32, 86). 3 Officer Gilles squeezed
the bags and then suggested that the bags contained video tapes (see
Addendum A ) .

Menke responded affirmatively.

Having concluded that

the bags did not contain video tapes4, Officer Dalling took the bags
from Menke5 (T.32).

Menke did not authorize the officers to take

the bag or to examine its contents (T.20,89-90).

At that point,

Menke was not free to leave (T. 43).
Officer Gilles then began questioning Menke as to when
Menke had purchased the razor.

Menke responded that he had

purchased the razor two weeks prior.

(T. 33). Officer Gilles noted

price tag remnants on the box and left the scene

to investigate

whether any of the retail establishments in the area sold Braun
Razors (T. 22). Menke and Officer Dalling remained at the scene
33).

(T.

Officer Dalling then advised Menke of his Fifth Amendment

rights (T. 44). Sometime thereafter Officer Gilles returned with a
female witness from Weinstocks department store (T. 34). The
witness identified Mr.Menke as an individual she had seen earlier in
the housewares department (T. 48). It thereafter determined

^Testimony was in conflict as to the condition of the bag.
Officer Gilles testified that the bags were partially open exposing
the contents to view (T. 30). Menke testified that both bags were
rolled shut and that the contents could not be seen.
4

Officer Dalling testified that he could see the contents
of the bag and could tell they were not video tapes (T. 32). In his
police report, however, Officer Dalling stated that he could not
"identify what was in the sack" See Addendum "A".
^Testimony was once again in conflict as to who seized
Menke's bag. Officer Dalling admitted that he took the bag from
Menke (T. 32). Menke testified that an officer Olsen took the bag.
(T. 93).
- 4 -

that the razor had been stolen.

Mr. Menke was at that point

handcuffed and transported to the jail.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court committed reversible error in denying
Appellant's Motion to Suppress the evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The trial

court erred in determining that officers Gilles and Dalling had
reasonable suspicion to detain and question defendant.

Evidence

produced at trial established not only that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion, thus rendering the stop unreasonable at
inception, it also revealed that the stop was unreasonable in scope.
The trial court also erred in ruling that the officers had
probable cause to search two bags carried by Menke.
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR. MENKE AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS POSSESSIONS
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.

The trial court's denial of Menke's Motion to Suppress
evidence was based on two findings:

(1)

that officers Gilles and

Dalling had sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop, detain and
question Menke (T. 112); and (2)

that Officers Gilles and Dalling

had sufficient probable cause to justify the seizure of Menke's
property (T. 113).
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A. WHEN OFFICERS DALLING AND GILLES STOPPED MR.
MENKE, A SEIZURE OCCURRED.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App 1987) this
Court pointed out that the Fourth Amendment "functions to 'prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with
the privacy and personal security of individuals'".
omitted.)

(citation

Trujillo, 739 at 87.

Utah courts have recognized that not all encounters between
police and citizens amount to "seizures" (see Trujillo, 739 at 87;
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987).

Where a "seizure" does

occur, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply.

In Deitman, the Utah Supreme Court identified three levels
of interaction between police and citizens:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any
time and pose questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will; (2) an officer
may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however,
the "detention must be temporary and last no
- 6 -

longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest
a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18 (quoting United States
v. Merritt, 732 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)).
This Court in Trujillo stated that "[a] "seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only when the officer by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way
restricted the liberty of the person."

The Court went on to state:

"[w]hen a reasonable person, based on the totality of the
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the
officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to
leave a seizure occurs."

Id, (quoting United States v. Mendenhall,

446 US 594, 554 (1980)) .
Based on the totality of circumstances existing at the time
that the officers stopped and questioned Menke, it is clear that
Menke's "encounter" with Officers Dalling and Gilles was not the
product of desire to cooperate with police but rather was based on a
reasonable belief that he was not free to leave.

Initially, it is

evident that officers used a show of authority to detain Menke.
Testimony from the hearing established that officer Dalling exited a
police vehicle driven by officer Gilles, approached Menke, ^produced
a "flat badge and identified himself as an officer (T30).
stopped immediately (T.38)

Menke

Officer Gilles joined Dalling and the

two immediately began to question Menke about the contents of his
sack (T. 8, 39). Menkefs refusal to respond is indicative of a lack
of desire to cooperate.

Officer Dalling also testified that back-up

units were summoned and that they responded (T. 45). The actions of
- 7 -

the officers in calling a back up officer immediately after arriving
indicate an intention to detain Menke.
It is also apparent that the officers employed physical
force to detain Mr. Menke.

Menke testified that the officers

directed him to a nearby bench by placing one hand on his elbow, one
hand on his shoulder and ordering him to sit on the bench.
68).

(T.

As set forth in footnote 4 Supra the officers testimony does

not controvert Menke's rendition on this point.

In fact, Menkefs

position is supported by statements made by Officer Dalling on
cross-examination, as evidenced from the following colloquy:

Q:

How many seconds did you have to observe Mr. Menke:

A:

What do you mean?

Q:

Well, you say that . . .

A:

Once Gilles pointed him out to me . . .

Q:

Yes.

A:

. . I watched him until we got a hold of him.

Q:

So you . .

A:

We made a U-turn, and I watched him until we got him.

(T. 37 (emphasis added))

*>Menke testified that officer Dalling "jumped out of a car
and come (sic) rushing toward me" (T. 66)

Menke should not be penalized for the officers failure to
remember details of the stop and/or failure to controvert Menke's
rendition of events.

The burden is on the State to prove that the

detention and warrantless search was lawful.
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984).

See State v.

The State is, therefore,

required to establish either that no seizure occurred or that if one
did, it was valid.

Menke's testimony of the events and officer

Dalling's testimony on cross-examination raises the inference that
at best officer Dalling used force to detain Menke, and thus
"seized" him.
Furthermore, Menke remained with the officers not out of a
"spirit of cooperation" but rather because he believed he was not
free to leave. As previously stated, the officers used a show of
authority to stop Menke.

In addition, Officers Dalling and Gilles

testified that Menke did not answer their questions (T. 9.30).

Such

silence indicates a reluctance to cooperate with the officers.

In

addition, the officers never informed Menke that he was free to
leave (T 20,45).

Menke himself did not feel he was free to leave.

(T. 69).
Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable
person in the defendants position would believe that he was not free
to leave, and, therefore, a seizure occurred.

The trial court made

no specific ruling regarding whether or not a "seizure" occurred.
However, the court ruled that officers had reasonable suspicion
"sufficient for an officer to stop an individual for questioning"

- 9 -

(T. 112). Implicit in such a holding is a finding that Menke was
"seized".

Whether that seizure was lawful is the next point

addressed by appellant.

B. THE OFFICERS DETENTION OF MR. MENKE WAS NOT
BASED ON A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT
A CRIME HAD BEEN OR WAS ABOUT TO HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968), the United States
Supreme Court established a limited exception to the general
requirement that officers obtain a warrant, based on probable cause,
for all seizures of persons.

The Court recognized that a police

officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating the
possibility of criminal activity even though probable cause to make
an arrest does not exist,

Td. at 22. However, a brief detention,

without probable cause to arrest, which results in any curtailment
of that person's liberty by the police must be supported by a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in
criminal activity.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah adopts language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.

Utah has codified the Terry requirement

that detention of a person by the police for investigative purposes
must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended states:
A police officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
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Section

committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address, and an
explanation of his actions (emphasis added).
See also State v. Swanigan, 699 p.2d 718 (Utah 1985).
In justifying a particular detention, an officer must be
able to point to specific articulable facts which, when viewed under
an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion that the
defendant committed or is about to commit a crime.
supra; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1988).

Terry v. Ohio,

In addition, any

detention must be reasonable at its inception and reasonable in
scope.
In the case at bar, the officers detention of Mr. Menke was
not reasonable at inception.

The facts relied on by the officers in

their decision to detain Menke do not give use to a finding of
reasonable suspicion.
By all accounts, it was officer Gilles who first noticed
defendant on First South.

Based on what he saw, Gilles concluded

that Menke had stolen property and commented to officer Dalling,
"Ray, look at that guy, he's got some stolen property he's taking
from underneath his shirt" (T. 8). the officers then executed a
U-turn and stopped Menke.
Because Gilles had instantaneously decided that the
property was stolen, his conclusion could have only been based on
facts made known to him prior to the time he stopped Menke.
Accordingly, the Court must focus on those facts to determine
whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Menke. As
evidenced from the following excerpt, Gilles relied on three factors
to support his conclusion that the items he saw were stolen:

First of all, the defendant is standing in front
of a flower pot on - - just off Main and First
South, he's removing items from under his
clothing. Secondly, as he's doing that, he's
basically (sic) at them to sort of look at what
they are, and third, he's bagging them in
non-retail merchandise type sacks".
(T. 19)
The foregoing factors, without more, do not give rise to
reasonable suspicion.

Initially, Gilles was approximately 50-70

feet away from Menke when he first observed him.

(T. 37). In

addition, the vehicle he was operating was moving (T. 37). If
Officer Gilles testimony is to be believed, it would have been
impossible for Officer Gilles to have noticed anything other than
the fact that Menke had "property".

(See T. 7 and Addendum A).

It

would have been impossible for him to have made a determination as
to what the "property" was.

Secondly, at that point in time,

neither officer Gilles or officer Dalling could have made any
affirmative determination as to where the property came from.

There

had been no reports of crime, no reports of theft, and no reports of
a shoplift involving a razor from Weinstocks (T. 15, 37). In
addition, officer Gilles testified that he did not see Menke enter
or leave the mall (T. 27).
Officer Gilles1 subjective interpretation of Menke's
activities led him to believe, instantly, that the "property" was
stolen.

Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the

issue's furtive actions, the question has been the focus of
significant decision by the Supreme Court of California.

In People

vs. Bower, the California court recognized the inherent problems in
attempting to infer criminal intent from a furtive action:
- 12 -

The difficulty is that from the view point of the
observer, an innocent gesture can often be
mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only
perceive the gesture accurately, he must also
interpret it in accordance with the actor's true
intent. But if words are not infrequently
ambiguous, gestures are even more so. Many are
wholly nonspecific, and can be assigned a meaning
only in their context. Yet the observer may view
that context quite otherwise from the actor: not
only is his vantage point different, he may even
have approached the scene with a preconceived
notion consciously or subconsciously - of what
gestures he expected to see and what he expected
them to mean. The potential for misunderstanding
in such a situation is obvious.
597 P.2d 115, 120-121 (Ca. 1979) (quoting People
v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (Ca.
1970) (emphasis in original)).
The California high court correctly recognized that the
reasons for movements interpreted by an officer as furtive may run
the spectrum from wholly legitimate to completely criminal.

Because

of the great possibility of misinterpretation, courts, as well as
peace officers, must necessarily be exceedingly cautious when basing
suspicion on gestures of citizens.
The case at bar presents a situation wherein the
possibility for misinterpretation was extremely great.

There is

nothing criminal or even suspicious about being on a sidewalk and
removing "property" from under a shirt and placing it in a bag;
especially when the officers could have had no idea that the
property was or where it came from.

there are wholly legitimate

reasons for carrying property in ones clothing:

ease of carrying,

protection from the elements, protection from theft, to name a few.
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Given the circumstances of the case at bar, such gestures are not
indicative of criminal activity.

For a gesture to be indicative of

criminal activity it must be unambiguously suspicious. Otherwise,
ordinary gestures observed in daily life, such as the gesture
involved in this case, would justify the police detaining and
questioning law-abiding citizens.
Menke's detention was also unreasonable in scope. Menke
testified that one of the officers made several attempts to take the
bag from him and at one

point squeezed the contents of the

McDonalds sack (T. 71-71).

Menke identified this individual as

officer Olsen and stated that Olson also took the bag away from
Menke (T. 72). The police report, however, states that officer
Gilles "had felt the outside of the box and asked Menke if they were
video tapes in the sack" (See Addendum "A") (T. 41-42).
While Menke may have been confused as to the identity of
the officers involved, one thing is clear:

the police "squeezed"

Menke's property prior to actually taking the bags and prior to the
time they allegedly caught Menke in a lie.

Such actions amount to

an illegal search violative of Menke's Fourth Amendment rights.
Menke asserts that the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain him.

Absent reasonable suspicion, any

subsequent search would have be an additional violation of Menke's
rights.

Assuming however, for purposes of argument only, that the

officers had sufficient cause to detain and question Menke, they
were not justified in searching Menke's belongings.

Terry vs. Ohio

makes clear that officers investigating an individual whom they
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reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity may only conduct
a pat down search for weapons and may only do so when the officer
reasonably believes that the person under investigation is armed and
dangerous.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25.

The "squeezing" of the bags amounts to a clear violation of
Mr. Menke's Fourth Amendment rights.

It is clear that Menke did not

in any way authorize officer Gilles to touch or squeeze his
belongings.

Not one of the three officers testified that they

believed that Menke was armed or dangerous, or that they suspected
him of carrying a weapon.

In addition, the officers did not conduct

a pat down search of Menke's clothing and body, the only type of
search authorized by Terry.

Further, it is evident from the fact

and circumstances of this case that the police searched the bag only
because they thought the bag contained stolen property.
officers1 curiosity clearly got the best of them.

The

A violation of

Menke's constitutional rights followed, thus exceeding the scope of
a reasonable "Terry" stop.

C. OFFICERS PALLING AND GILLES LACKED PROBABLE
CAUSE TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF MENKE'S
POSSESSIONS.
The evidence produced at Menke's Suppression hearing
established that there were two separate and distinct searches of
Menke's belongings.

The first occurred when Officer Gilles

"squeezed" the contents of the bag (See Addendum

"A") (T. 41-42).

The second search occurred when Officer Dalling took the bag from
Menke and examined its contents.
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It is undisputed that the above-mentioned searches were
conducted without a warrant.

Case law dealing with the

constitutionality of searches and seizures has made clear that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the State can
demonstrate that the search in question falls clearly within one of
the carefully defined set of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967); United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir.
1986).

Based on arguments made at the hearing, it is clear that the

State was relying on two exceptions to the warrant requirement
rule:

the search incident to arrest exception and the exigent

circumstances exception (T 100, 107).
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
validity of the search incident to arrest exception.

See Preston v.

United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.
640 (1983).

However, for the exception to apply, there must be an

arrest and for there to be a valid arrest there must be probable
cause.

"[T]he general rule [is] that every arrest, and every

seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest is
unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause".
692, 700 (1981).

452 U.S.

Analysis now focuses on whether there was probable

cause to justify an arrest when officer Gilles squeezed the bag.

If

not, all evidence obtained from that point on would be tainted and
unadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Prior to the time the officers stopped Menke they observed
Menke remove an item from his clothing, look at the item briefly
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and placed the item in a sack.

The officers then stopped Menke,

identified themselves as officer, requested ID from Menke and
questioned Menke about the contents of the sack.

Menke did not

respond to the officer's inquiries and appeared nervous (T. 45-46).
Officer Gilles squeezed the bag positioned at Menke's side and asked
Menke whether the bags contained video tapes (T. 9, 30)(See Addendum
"A").

Menke responded affirmatively (T. 9, 30).
Appellant has previously established that the officers

lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and question him.

However,

assuming for purposes of argument only that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to detain Menke, facts

made known to the

officers immediately following detention and prior to the
"squeezing" of the bag did not give rise to probable cause. The
only additional facts evident were Menke's non-responsiveness and
nervous demeanor.

In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.

1987) this court clearly stated that "'nervous1 conduct . . . is
consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior"' Id at 89.
The Court also made clear that an individuals refusal to answer
questions "does not furnish reasonable grounds for further
detention".

Id at 88 (citation omitted).

It is apparent that the

officers were playing a hunch based on their subjective
interpretation of Menke's actions and demeanor.

Probable cause

"mean[s] more than bare suspicion" Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949) and is a more stringent standard than
reasonable suspicion.

Menke's silence and nervous demeanor simply

can not serve to elevate the officers hunch to probable cause.
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The foregoing establishes that the initial search or
"squeezing" of Menke's property was not supported by probable cause
and

therefore was violative of Menke's Fourth Amendment rights.

Therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional
search of the bags is unadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree".
Officer Gilles testified that Menke responded affirmatively
when asked whether the bags contained video tapes. However,
Dalling's police report indicates that this inquiry was the product
of information gleaned when Gilles squeezed the bags.

Menkefs

affirmation that video tapes were present in the bag was likewise
the product of the unconstitutional search.

Officer Dalling

testified that he relied on Menke's statement in making his decision
to take the bag from Menke and examine its contents.

In fact,

Dalling testified that it was the fact that he believed Menke was
lying in response to Gilles statement that gave him probable cause
to search the sack (T. 46). Menke's affirmation was clearly the
product of a Fourth Amendment violation and is unadmissible, see
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963)
(incriminating statements made by defendant were held
inadmissible.)

The subsequent search of the sack and its contents

is likewise tainted.
A second position relied on by the State to justify the
search of the bags was the exigent circumstances exception (T.
107).

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the

exigent circumstances exception can come into play in

any one of a

number of scenarios including instances where there is a likelihood
that delay could result in the loss or destruction of evidence.
- 18 -

See

Arkansas v, Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,759 (1979).

However, for the

exigent circumstances exception to apply, there must be a finding of
not only the existence of exigent circumstances, but also a finding
of probable cause. Neither officer testified that they thought
Menke was a risk to flee the scene or that he would destroy evidence,
Again, it is necessary to discuss whether the officers had
probable cause to justify the search of Menke's bag.
reveals that they did not.

Prior analysis

Even if this Court were to find that the

officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Menke, Menke's silence and
demeanor were clearly insufficient to elevate reasonable suspicion
to probable cause.

Therefore, inasmuch as the officers lacked

probable cause, Gilles1 squeezing of Menke's bag violated Menke's
constitutional rights. Any evidence thereafter obtained, including
verbal as well as physical evidence, was tainted by the illegal
search and is inadmissible.

CONCLUSION

The State did not meet its burden of establishing that the
detention of Richard Menke and the subsequent search of his bags and
their contents were lawful.

Therefore, the detention and the

ensuing search violated Menke's Fourth Amendment rights. All the
fruits which flowed from the illegal detention and search should be
suppressed.

For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Menke

respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and
remand the case to the trial court with an Order of Dismissal or
suppression of the illegally seized evidence.

Respectfully submitted this

$$

day of April, 1989.

R. M O F ^ /
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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